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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes a model of investment with ﬁxed investment costs and capital market
imperfections. In this model ﬁnance inﬂuences the level of capital ﬁrms hold, as well as the
frequency at which they invest. In consequence investment reacts nonlinearly with respect to
shocks to productivity and liquidity. Liquidity and productivity shocks are complements and
the inﬂuence of ﬁnance is strongest if a ﬁrm wishes to signiﬁcantly adjust capital for
fundamental reasons.
This theoretical model is confronted with UK company data in a two-step estimation that ﬁrst
identiﬁes the long-run relationship of productivity, capital and liquidity. Here we ﬁnd no
signiﬁcant inﬂuence of ﬁnance on the capital decision of a ﬁrm. However, when the short-run
investment function is estimated, liquidity has a signiﬁcant impact, which is also strongest for
strong fundamental investment incentives. Moreover, the investment function is strongly
convex in the fundamentals themselves, indicating ﬁxed costs of capital adjustment.
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Economists’ knowledge of micro-level and aggregate investment is still far from being
conclusive. Seemingly well established however is the view that the workhorse of the
neoclassical investment model, the q-model of investment, has a hard time explaining
empirically observed patterns of investment.1 The question of which assumption of the
neoclassical model leads to its failure to what extent is yet to be answered.
Beginning with Fazzari et al. (1988) the empirical literature has emphasized the role
of ﬁnancial factors in ﬁrm-level investment. More recently attention has been drawn to
the role of non-convexities in the investment technology. This paper aims at merging
both of these strands and shows that ﬁnancial factors and non-convexities are both
simultaneously important since each signiﬁcantly inﬂuences the eﬀect of the other.
This interaction has not been analyzed much, but very recently a few contributions
have drawn attention to the issue: Holt (2003) provides a theoretical real options model of
irreversible investment that shows how ﬁnancial frictions and irreversibility of investment
interact as complements, Whited (2004) provides evidence that ﬁrms which are identiﬁed
as ﬁnancially constrained exhibit investment spikes much less frequently, and Caggese
(2003) develops a formal test for ﬁnancial constraints based on the irreversibility of ﬁxed
investment.
Our approach diﬀers in both methodology and focus from these studies: With non-
convex adjustment costs, ﬁrms invest infrequently and lump their investment projects.
At ﬁrst, this paper shows that this lumpiness of investment theoretically opens two ways
for ﬁnance to aﬀect investment: On the one hand, ﬁnance may alter the target level of
capital to which a company adjusts and on the other hand it may directly inﬂuence the
frequency at which investment projects are carried out.
When we asses empirically which of the two channels is more important, ﬁnance
shows at best a minor inﬂuence on the capital levels that companies hold. By contrast
however, ﬁnance has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on investment. In consequence, ﬁnance has
an intertemporal substitution eﬀect, that is more liquidity speeds up investment.
This result is also informative in ﬁnding out about the actual form of frictions involved
in the investment decision. For example, one would expect the relative strength of both
eﬀects (level vs. frequency) to be just the reverse in a model in which the main inﬂuence
of ﬁnance comes via the cost of capital and convex adjustment cost lead to partial
adjustment of the current stock of capital to its target level. In such model a change
in ﬁnance translates into a change in the target level of capital to which actual capital
1See Caballero (2000).
1smoothly adjusts over time, which marks a clear diﬀerence to our model of interacting
frictions.
While this interaction between ﬁnance and non-convex adjustment costs has not
been much analyzed, non-convexities such as irreversibility or ﬁxed costs of investment
and other economies of scale have widely been discussed and have been theoretically
analyzed in a very general framework by Abel and Eberly (1994). Empirical evidence
for non-convexities is mostly drawn from the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD).
Doms and Dunne (1998), for example, report that—at the plant-level—a small fraction
of investment activities is associated with an overwhelmingly large fraction of changes
in the capital stock. Cooper et al. (1999) use the LRD to estimate a hazard model
of investment. They ﬁnd a time-increasing investment hazard and thus evidence for
non-convexities. A more direct approach has been taken by Caballero et al. (1995).
They estimate ”mandated investment” by imposing a long-run relation between earnings,
capital employed and the cost of capital. Explaining actual investment by mandated
investment in a second step, they empirically ﬁnd the convex relationship predicted by
the non-convex adjustment cost model of investment.
Additional evidence for non-convexities has also been drawn from other data than
the LRD.2 For instance, Caballero and Engel (1999) estimate a model of aggregate
investment dynamics that rests on a microeconomic model which features stochastic
non-convex adjustment costs. On the basis of 2-digit industry level panel data they ﬁnd
signiﬁcant ﬁx e dc o s t so fi n v e s t m e n ta n do b t a i nab e t t e rﬁt with their structural model
than with partial adjustment (convex cost) alternative models.
Besides this strong emphasis that the investment literature has put on the role of
non-convexities in investment decisions, it also has questioned some of the earlier papers
on ﬁnancial factors in investment.3 A whole series of papers has elaborated problems
of measurement errors and biased estimators that arise in q-theoretical regressions and
result in spuriously positive estimates of ﬁnancial variables.4 Most disappointing for the
ﬁnancial factors in investment literature are the results of Gomes (2001): In a pecking
order of ﬁnance framework he shows that the presence of ﬁnancial frictions is neither
2Abel and Eberly (2002) employ the Compustat data in a q-theoretic framework - their (1994)
augmented adjustment cost model - and ﬁnd evidence for non-convexities in the capital adjustment
technology, especially for ﬁxed costs. Goolsbee and Gross (2000) use micro-level airline industry data
within the framework of Caballero et al. (1995) and ﬁnd evidence for a convex investment-function.
However, this evidence vanishes by aggregation - even on the airline (company) level there is nearly no
evidence for non-convex adjustment costs.
3For a very exhaustive survey over the literature on capital market imperfections and investment see
Hubbard (1998).
4See for instance Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Cummins et al. (1999), Erickson and Whited (2000)
or Gomes (2001)
2suﬃcient nor necessary to obtain a (seemingly) signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcient on cash
ﬂow in a q-theoretic investment regression.5
Despite Gomes’ (2001) strong scepticism against including cash-ﬂow in q-regressions
of investment to pick up ﬁnancial frictions, Gomes’ (2001, p. 1279) contribution itself
arguably calls for the inclusion of other measures of the ﬁnancial status of a company in
an investment regression with non-convex adjustment costs. He points out in particular
that the investment behavior corresponding to a pecking order of ﬁnance model ”[...] is
somewhat similar to those used in the investment with ﬁxed cost literature” when not
controlling for the ﬁnancial status.
This implies that by ignoring ﬁnancial variables we might obtain a convex investment
function in fundamentals–and hence evidence for non-convex adjustment costs–only
due to ﬁxed costs of ﬁnancing activities. In Gomes’ example this holds true even though
cost of adjusting real capital are totally absent. However, also the other way round
the standard (S,s)-investment model produces some correlation between investment and
cash-ﬂow.6 Thus, we might ﬁnd evidence in favor of one friction only because the other
friction is present, for which we did not control. Therefore, an empirical formulation of
investment functions should allow for both ﬁnancial frictions and non-convex adjustment
costs simultaneously.
Obviously this makes a departure from the standard "Tobin’s q plus cash-ﬂow" model
of investment necessary. Because of that, we modify the Caballero and Engel (1999)
model, such that it captures most prominent speciﬁcations of ﬁnancial frictions: wealth
dependent cost of capital, credit rationing and the absence of external equity ﬁnance.
From this model, we infer that the (expected) investment of a company is a function of
only two variables: the ﬁrm’s mandated investment and the ﬁrm’s equity ratio, which is
the book value of a ﬁrm’s equity over the book value of its assets.7
5The explanation for this can be summarized in the following way: On the one hand, average q
will measure marginal q with errors, which generates a signiﬁcant cash ﬂow coeﬃcient even without
any ﬁnancial frictions. On the other, true marginal q already (partly) measures the impact of ﬁnancial
frictions—if such impact exist indeed.
6To see this, suppose that the productivity of capital is a random walk. Because of a ”region of
inactivity” in the (S,s) model, ﬁrms adjust after a series of unidirectional changes in productivity. Now,
these changes in productivity correspond to a series of rises (falls) in cash-ﬂow.
7This result reﬂects that from a general theoretical angle a measure for the line-of-credit is more likely
to be the appropriate indicator of ﬁnancial constraints to investment than cash-ﬂow is. A fact that was
pointed out early in the investment literature by Blinder (1988, p. 199). In particular if agency or other
informational market imperfections link discount factors to the availability of internal funds and hence
generate an investment liquidity correlation, the correct measure should be a stock- and not a ﬂow-item.
The result also has an empirical advantage: the pre-determined equity ratio (taken from the opening
balance of a company) is by contrast to cash-ﬂow unlikely to strongly correlate with current productivity
shocks that inﬂuence the investment decision.
3Additionally, our merged model predicts that ﬁnance inﬂuences the frequency of
investment; that this inﬂuence is strong in particular when there are strong fundamental
incentives to adjust the stock of capital; and that investment is a convex function in
fundamental investment incentives—like in the pure non-convex adjustment cost model.
The departure from the q plus cash-ﬂow framework is also partly motivated by the
fact that other non-q models, which are thus not subject to Gomes’ criticism, have
been able to provide evidence for ﬁnancial frictions.8 Moreover, with the direct eﬀect of
ﬁnance on the frequency of investment in the combined model, it is also able to tackle
another puzzle apparent in the investment literature: As a fact also evident in the sample
of UK ﬁrms used in the present paper, liquidity aﬀects investment in the short run but it
aﬀects capital much less in the long run. In particular when investment is estimated as
an error-correction-process, evidence for this has been reported but at the same time this
has hardly attracted attention.9 An extreme example is Guariglia (1999, pp. 47) who
reports that ﬁrm size and stock based liquidity proxies are empirically independent while
simultaneously liquidity inﬂuences investment signiﬁcantly. However, the investment-
frequency eﬀe c to fl i q u i d i t yi no u rm o d e li sa b l et oe x p l a i ns u c ho b s e r v a t i o n s .
Having analyzed the model theoretically, we then asses it empirically in an analysis
that draws on the ideas developed in Caballero et al. (1995). Infrequent investment
establishes a cointegration relation between the static optimal target level of capital and
the actual capital a company employs. This allows to recover the gap between actual
and desired level of capital from an estimation of a cointegrating vector between capital,
total factor productivity and the equity ratio. However, to minimize the inﬂuence of
measurement errors in this estimation, we deviate from Caballero et al.’s (1995) proce-
dure and combine their direct method with the idea of Cooper and Haltiwanger (2002)
to measure productivity indirectly. With our sample of UK companies, the Cambridge
DTI database, this allows to generate three preliminary measures of productivity from
which we then infer a ﬁnal estimate of productivity as the common factor imbedded in
all three of these.
This common factor is non-stationary and cointegrated with the level of capital
a company employs, but ﬁnance has no inﬂuence on the long run capital employment
decisions. The cointegration error identiﬁes the amount of mandated investment. Having
generated an estimate of mandated investment, the investment function is estimated
non-parametricly as a function of the equity ratio and mandated investment, which is
8See for instance Whited (1992), Whited (2004), Bond and Meghir (1994), or Gilchrist and Himmel-
berg (1998).
9See e.g. Hubbard (1998) or Mairesse et al. (1999) for an overview of the empirical literature on
ﬁrm-level investment and the time structure of liquidity eﬀects.
4the fundamental investment incentive. This second estimation shows that investment
is a non-linear function of both ﬁnance and fundamentals, that it is indeed convex in
fundamentals, that ﬁnance has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on investment, and that—in line
with the theoretical prediction— the stronger is this inﬂuence, the stronger fundamental
incentives are.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops a model that
describes ﬁrm level investment under the assumption of capital market imperfections
and ﬁxed costs of investment. Within this section, Section 2.1 describes the company’s
choice problem whereas 2.2 discusses the properties of the investment function. Section
3 presents empirical evidence for the model and draws on ﬁrm level investment data
from the Cambridge DTI database. Section 4 concludes and an appendix follows.
2 A theoretical model
2.1 Firm-level investment
We begin by presenting and discussing the representative problem of a ﬁrm which is at
t h es a m et i m es u b j e c tt oﬁnancial constraints and ﬁxed adjustment costs. For simplicity
and as in Caballero and Engel (1999), this ﬁrm is a monopolisticly competitive single-
plant and single-product ﬁrm. The investment decision is modelled in discrete time and
a ﬁrm faces an inﬁnitely elastic supply of all factors. At the beginning of each period
all uncertainty about that period is resolved and is common knowledge from then on.
Thereafter, each ﬁrm decides upon investment.
2.1.1 Adjustment technology and ﬁnancial constraint
If a ﬁrm wants to change its capital stock it has to pay some ﬁxed costs; all other factors
may be adjusted without cost. At the end of every period a ﬁrm has to pay back its last
period’s debt plus interest, has to pay for any new purchased capital goods and for all
other factors. Moreover, the ﬁrm can issue new debt and pay out dividends.
Besides a non-convexity in the adjustment cost, ﬁrms face a capital market imper-
fection: As in Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998) and as an extremely simpliﬁed version
of the pecking order theory of ﬁnance, there will be a no-new-equity constraint ﬁrst of
all, i.e. ﬁrms cannot issue new shares or to have negative dividends.
Assumption 1: Once founded, ﬁrms are unable to issue new equity. In particular,
dividend payments Dt must be non-negative at any point in time: ∀t : Dt ≥ 0.
This simpliﬁed version of the pecking order theory is necessary to keep the model
5tractable.10 Nevertheless, the general results should not change if this assumption were
replaced by a more complex version of ﬁnancial transaction costs as in Gomes (2001).
Moreover, this assumption does not contradict empirical ﬁndings. For example Fried-
man (1982) shows empirically that ﬁrms hardly use any external equity ﬁnance at all.
Additionally, this assumption is theoretically supported by Fries et al. (1997), who show
that full collataralization- and ”no new equity”-constraints may theoretically arise as an
industry equilibrium.
Secondly, we assume a collateral constraint, i.e. the amount of debt a ﬁrm may issue
is limited by the actual stock of capital.
Assumption 2: The maximum fraction of capital that can be pledged for debt shall
be ˆ b. Moreover, b b ≤ sup
n
b ∈ R++| b ≤ 1−δ
1+r(b)
o
, where δ is the depreciation rate
and r is the interest rate that might depend on b.
This assumption can be viewed as a version of Hart and Moore’s (1994) debt capacity
model. The qualiﬁcation ensures that the company has at no time more outstanding
debt obligations than it holds assets. This ensures that the ﬁrm always has a positive
book value of equity and will not have to declare bankruptcy.
The third, last, and weakest assumption regarding capital market imperfections is
that the interest rate on debt r only depends on the ﬁnancial leverage B
K. As Gilchrist
and Himmelberg (1998), we assume r to be homogenous of degree zero in B and K, and
to be weakly increasing in B. This does not rule out r to be independent of B and K.
Assumption 3: The interest rate is a diﬀerentiable function of
Bt+1













Now let K∗ denote the frictionless stock of capital of a ﬁrm, which is the stock of capital
that would be chosen in the absence of ﬁxed costs of investment and capital market
imperfections. Let K be the actual capital employed. The ﬁrm generates earnings by
employing capital and the perfectly ﬂexible adjustable factors. Optimizing over these
factors yields a semi-reduced function of earnings per-period (EBIT), Π,
This function is linear homogenous in the frictionless stock of capital K∗ and can be
10Although it greatly simpliﬁes, this assumption is actually taken for the sake of tractability by many
papers with a structrural model for ﬁnancing constraints, see for examples Whited (1992), Gilchrist and
Himmelberg (1998), or Bayraktar et al. (2003).
6written as:11
Π(z,K∗)=π(z)K∗. (1)
In this function z denotes the capital imbalance, which is the ratio of actual capital
employed to frictionless capital: z := K
K∗. Henceforth, z typically refers to the capital
imbalance at the beginning of each period and before investment takes place, while zo
refers to the target level of the capital imbalance, which is the imbalance after investment.
The earnings function π itself is strictly concave and fulﬁll the (Inada) conditions π(0) =
0 and lim
z→0
π0(z)=+ ∞. To ensure that proﬁts are bounded, we denote the discount factor
by ψ and the depreciation rate by δ and assume lim
z→+∞
π0(z) <ψ δ .
To model the non-convex costs we assume that when a ﬁrm invests, production halts.
The duration of this stop is determined by the random variable w which represents the
time used for the installation of the new capital, which is analogous to the adjustment
costs assumption in Caballero and Engel (1999). Therefore, the costs, A, of adjusting
the capital stock are given by:
A(zo,K∗,w): =wπ(zo)K∗, (2)




Note that in the presence of depreciation or a positive trend in productivity the ﬁrm will
typically invest up to a larger stock of capital than the frictionless optimal one, K∗
t , to
keep the distance between desired and actual stock of capital small on average.
2.1.3 Dynamics of the stochastic variables
So far we have put no restrictions on the stochastic dynamics of the random variables K∗
t
and wt. Both variables together completely determine ﬁrm heterogeneity and investment
dynamics, so that any assumptions on these variables are crucial. A minimal assumption
for keeping the model tractable is that both variables exhibit the Markov property.
Furthermore, we shall assume that the stop in production can be at most for one entire
period, so that wt ∈]0;1[. Additionally wt shall be i.i.d., and K∗
t follows a geometric
random walk (with drift), whose innovations ξt are normally distributed and serially





=e x p( ξt). (3)
11This assumption of linear homogeneity just as the other assumptions with respect to π are for
example fulﬁlled if demand is iso-elastic and the production function is Cobb-Douglas. See Caballero
and Engel (1999) for details.
72.1.4 Capital market and the ﬁrm’s objective
Although ﬁrms are hence situated in a risky environment, they are assumed to be risk-
neutral. They seek to maximize the expected, discounted dividend stream and do so
by choosing some capital imbalance zo (the amount of capital employed, zoK∗)a n dt h e
amount of debt used to ﬁnance production, Bt+1.
In order to ﬁnance investment, a ﬁrm can either cut back dividend payments Dt or
raise debt Bt+1. As assumed, a ﬁrm is unable to sell any new shares or raise equity
by negative dividends (assumption 1). Moreover, the amount of debt a ﬁrm can issue
is limited by the actual stock of capital employed (assumption 2). Additionally, the
interest rate is a function of the debt ratio bt := Bt
Kt−1 and is weakly increasing in bt
(assumption 3).12 Therefore, dividend payments, Dt, are given by
Dt = D(zo
t,B t+1,K∗
t ,w t,z t,B t)
:= Π(zo
t,K∗
t ) − A(zo
t,K∗
t ,w t)I{zo
t 6=zt} − K∗
t (zo
t − zt)+Bt+1 − (1 + r(bt))Bt (4)
in which I is an indicator function for investment activity. If the time invariant discount
factor is denoted by ψ and the value of the ﬁrm is denoted by V, then the following
Bellman equation determines both ﬁrm value V and the optimal investment policy:
V (K∗
















In this expression X := X (K∗
t ,w t,z t,B t) is the correspondence of ﬁnancially feasible
capital-imbalance and debt pairs. Et denotes the expectations operator, conditional on
information available at time t.
To simplify notation, let the ratio of the book value of equity over the book value
of capital be denoted by et. This "equity ratio" is a function of last period’s debt ratio
bt = Bt
Kt−1, and is given by et := e(bt)=1 −
(1+r(bt))
1−δ bt. To reduce the number of
state variables and to obtain a more convenient formulation of the problem at hand, we
subtract the book value of equity from ﬁrm value V and divide by K∗
t . This deﬁnes a
new value function v := V
K∗
t − etzt. This function represents the diﬀerence between the
12The interst rate for bonds increases by assumption in our model, and is not derived endogenously.
In fact, as we have explicitely ruled out bankruptcies, debt is even risk-free. Hence, this assumption is
strictly speaking inconsistent with the model. Yet, to rule out risky debt is only to simplify and focus the
analysis. Introducing another risk term that enters after the investment decisions are made and adding
bankruptcy costs for the debt holders would generate an upward sloping interest function. However, this
would also complicate the analysis substantially.
8economic value of a ﬁrm’s equity and the equity’s book value (relative to its optimal stock
of capital K∗). As both the equity ratio et and frictionless capital K∗
t are determined
before the optimal policy decision is taken, maximizing v and maximizing V yield the
same optimal policy.
To also replace the set of alternatives X by a set that only includes relative variables,
we deﬁne the correspondence Y that gives ﬁnancially feasible plans in terms of zo and
bo for capital-imbalance and debt pairs (”plans”) with strictly positive capital: 13
Y (z,e,w): =
½




zo [1 − wI{zo6=z}] ≤ bo ≤ b b
¾
. (6)
The ﬁrst inequality in this deﬁnition of Y represents the positive-dividend constraint
and the second inequality reﬂects the debt-ceiling b b, the maximum debt-to-capital ratio.
After some tedious calculations,14 we obtain for v
v(z,e,w): = m a x
(zo,bo)∈Y ∪(0,0)











From this equation, we see that value v is composed of four elements, all normalized by
K∗ : current cash-ﬂow π (zo), the diﬀerence between the discounted book value of equity
at the beginning of the next period (1 − δ)ψzo
te(bo) and its current value (1 − bo)zo,
adjustment cost and ﬁnally the expected value of v discounted for one period.
To simplify notation further, we now deﬁne an auxiliary value function ˜ v. This func-
tion equals the that equals the maximized expression in (7) disregarding adjustment
costs. Hence, ˜ v(z,b) is deﬁned by










In turn, ﬁrm value v can now be expressed relatively simple in terms of ˜ v as
v(z,e,w)= m a x
(zo,bo)∈Y (z,e,w)∪(0,0)
˜ v(zo,b o) − π(zo)wI{zo6=z} .( 9 )
However, the inclusion of state (0,0) complicates the analysis of the ﬁrm’s choice problem
somewhat. Choosing (0,0) means that the ﬁrm will leave the market. Yet, the following
13We also restrict the ﬁrms to be unable to hold ﬁnancial assets, i.e. b ≥ 0.T h i si sd o n ef o rt e c h n i c a l
convinience. Alternatively, we may assume that the ﬁrm’s discountfactor is larger than the market rate
for ﬁnancial assets, so that ﬁrms prefer to pay out dividends over accumulating ﬁnancial assets.
14See appendix.
9Lemma proves that it is always possible and proﬁtable for a ﬁrm to avoid bankruptcy
in our model and hence no ﬁrm chooses (0,0) to leave the market. Intuitively default is
not proﬁtable because of the monopoly rents that the ﬁrm would forgo by defaulting.
Lemma 1 (a) Y is non-empty and
( b )e m p l o y i n gz e r oc a p i t a li ss u b o p t i m a l ,i . e .
max
(zo,bo)∈Y (z,e,w)
˜ v(zo,b o) − π(zo)wI{zo6=z} >ψ Et[v(0,0,w t+1) > 0
Proof. See appendix.
Because of the above Lemma, ﬁrms never stop production completely, and they
never declare bankruptcy. Because of the above Lemma, the optimal policy is always an
element of Y and thus the Bellman equation deﬁning v simpliﬁes to:
v(z,e,w)= m a x
(zo,bo)∈Y (z,e,w)
˜ v(zo,b o) − π(zo)wI{zo6=z} . (10)
2.1.5 Adjustment
In general, the correspondence Y of ﬁnancially feasible plans is only upper-hemicontinuous,
thus v might not be continuous everywhere. The lack of continuity arises because of the
ﬁxed adjustment costs. If a ﬁrm employs a large stock of capital and is heavily indebted,
it may ﬁnd itself unable to cover the debt obligations without selling capital if the cap-
ital imbalance or the debt level rises marginally. In this case the ﬁrm may be forced
to substantially decrease its stock of capital to repay debt since it also has to cover the
additional cost of disinvestment. Because of this it is necessary to distinguish two cases
when describing ﬁrm level investment:
(a) The ﬁrm is in danger of becoming insolvent: this happens, if
1 − et −
π(zt)
zt
>b b . (11)
In this case the ﬁrm has a negative cash ﬂow and cannot sustain the actual level of
capital employed by issuing new debt. Expressed formally, this means that the set of
debt-ratios that can be attained without adjustment of capital,
Z(z,e): =
n
bo ∈ R++|1 − e −
π(z)
z ≤ bo ≤ b b
o
,
10is empty. In this situation, the ﬁrm must (heavily) cut back production and so increases
its average productivity. In consequence, a ﬁrm always disinvests if in ﬁnancial distress.
(b) The ﬁrm is not in danger of becoming insolvent:
Then, a ﬁrm adjusts its stock of capital (i.e. it invests) in period t if the expected
increase in value outweighs adjustment costs. Denote the (optimal) capital-imbalance
after adjustment with z∗ = z∗(z,e,w) and the ratio of debt to capital after adjustment by
b∗ = b∗(z,e,w). Additionally, denote the optimal debt level without capital adjustment
by b+ := argmax
bo∈Z(zt,et)
˜ v(zt,b o). Here, again Z(z,e) is the set of feasible debt-ratios with only
ﬁnancial readjustment. Then a ﬁrm invests if







which can be equivalently posed as
wt ≤
˜ v(z∗,b ∗) − ˜ v(zt,b +)
π(z∗)
. (12)
As shown in the appendix, the value of a ﬁrm that adjusts is monotonically decreasing
in wt, so that for every (et,z t) there exists an unique trigger ¯ w such that
˜ v(z∗,b ∗) − wπ(z∗)
Value of a ﬁrm adjusting the stock of capital
R ˜ v(zt,b +)
Value when only readjusting ﬁnance
if w Q ¯ w . (13)
Since ¯ w is implicitly deﬁned by the maximum values ˜ v − wπI attains over Z and Y,
the reaction of ¯ w induced by changes in e or z are directly related to the Lagrangian
multipliers associated to the positive-dividend constraint
zo − ez − π(zo)[1 − wI{zo6=z}] − bozo ≤ 0. (14)
Denoting the multipliers for the full optimization by λ∗ and for the ﬁnancial readjustment
by λ+. As shown in the appendix (Proposition 4), we can express ∂ ¯ w

























This means the inﬂuence of ﬁnance is directly related to the diﬀerence between λ∗ and
11λ+. The maximal costs at which the company is willing to adjust its stock of capital
increases in e if λ∗ is larger than λ+ and decreases otherwise.
The multiplier λ∗ is for example larger than λ+ if investment cannot be paid from
current cash ﬂow, while the optimal debt level b+ can be reached with still paying out
dividends. In this case λ∗ > 0=λ+ and an increase in the equity ratio allows the
company to invest at larger costs, ∂ ¯ w
∂e > 0. Although λ+ =0might be an extreme case,
with non-convex adjustment costs investment projects are often suﬃciently large, so that
they exceed current cash ﬂow which results in λ∗ > 0.
However, for ﬁrms making losses from a suboptimal large capital stock, the situation
is just reverse. Since selling capital generates a cash-ﬂow that can be use to pay oﬀ debt,
λ∗ will be small, potentially λ∗ =0 , while λ+ will be large, as the company’s debt burden
increases to ﬁnance losses, moving b further away from the unconstrained optimal level.
Consequently, we can expect ∂ ¯ w
∂e ≥ 0 for those ﬁrms that invest substantially and for




Since the ﬁrm’s investment decision only depends on the comparison of two values wt and
¯ w(zt,e t), ¯ w(zt,e t) deﬁnes a critical value Ω which is the largest value of the stoppage





if Z (z,e) 6= ∅
if Z (z,e)=∅15 (17)
As only contemporary state variables matter for the aggregation, the time indices of
state variables are suppressed henceforth for e and z.L e tG(w) be the distribution of w.
Then the investment hazard can be deﬁned as Λ(z,e): =G(Ω(z,e)) and we can deﬁne
the average capital imbalance ¯ z∗ obtained after investment by ﬁrms whose equity ratio
has been e and capital imbalance has been z before investment. This average capital
imbalance is the conditional expectation of z∗(z,e,w), conditional on w ≤ Ω(z,e). This




15Since w ∈]0;1[, Pr(w ≤ 1) = 1.
12Since adjustment-cost shocks w are i.i.d., the cross-sectional average investment rate
equals the expected investment rate i(z,e) unconditional on the ﬁrm’s adjustment cost
parameter w. The expected investment rate i in turn is the product of the probability














Now, diﬀerentiating this expression for the investment rate i with respect to e yields an













(¯ z∗(z,e) − z)
z
∂Λ(z,e)
∂e | {z }
frequency-eﬀect
(20)
As one can see from this equation, in our ﬁxed capital adjustment cost model, ﬁnance
has two ways to inﬂuence investment decisions. First, there is an eﬀect coming from
a change in the target level of capital, to which the ﬁrm adjusts by investment. This
eﬀect is a long-run or level eﬀect, since it alters the stock of capital a ﬁrm likes to hold.
By contrast, the second way ﬁnance inﬂuences investment has only short run impact on
the ﬁrm’s level of capital. Due to the direct eﬀect of ﬁnance on the critical adjustment
cost ¯ w and hence on the frequency of investment, ﬁnancial healthier ﬁrms invest more
often. In consequence, their capital imbalance will be smaller, in turn decreasing the
probability of further investment. It is because of this frequency eﬀe c tt h a ti n v e s t m e n t
can be more sensitive to the ﬁnancial situation than the optimal stock of capital is.
Moreover, this frequency eﬀect makes fundamental investment incentives, which are
captured by the capital imbalance, and ﬁnance complements in the investment decision
in two senses. Firstly, only if the company wants to carry out large investment projects,
i.e.
(¯ z∗(z,e)−z)
z is large, an increase in the adjustment frequency Λ can have a large eﬀect.
Secondly, from the discussion of ∂ ¯ w
∂e we know that the eﬀect of ﬁnance on the critical
level of adjustment cost is only large if z takes on very small or very large values.
2.3 Discriminating between our model and alternatives
This frequency eﬀect is central in discriminating between the model of this paper and the
two most prominent models of ﬁnancial frictions with convex adjustment cost: pecking-
order of ﬁnance models à la Myers and Majluf (1984) and ﬁnancial accelerator models
with liquidity- or wealth-dependent cost of capital à la Bernanke and Gertler (1989) or
Bernanke et al. (1998). In the latter models, when adjustment costs are convex, the










inﬂuence of ﬁnance comes via the target level of capital.16 An eﬀect of liquidity on the
speed of adjustment in these models can only be of second-order: Slower adjustment
marginally saves internal funds, such that the marginal gains of faster adjustment and
the marginal-costs of internal funds are equalized. More liquidity hence only inﬂuences
adjustment speed by altering its own marginal cost. By contrast, we have seen that
in the ﬁxed adjustment cost model, with investment being an extramarginal decision, a
change in liquidity renders some projects unproﬁtable at given adjustment costs. This
gives liquidity a ﬁrst-order inﬂuence on adjustment.
In contrast, a pecking-order model of ﬁnance features a short run eﬀect of liquidity.
In this model, three regimes of ﬁrm ﬁnance typically emerge as stylized in ﬁgure 1.17
To the left are those ﬁrms with a high value of z (whose diﬀerence between K and
K∗ is small). They are ﬁnancially unconstrained. Since they do not wish to invest
much, they can rely on internal ﬁnance, and their investment decision is independent of
their liquidity constraint. When the gap between K and K∗ widens and ﬁrms obtain
an intermediate value of z, they become strictly constrained by liquidity and a change
in liquidity changes investment. Only ﬁrms with a low value of z rely on external
ﬁnance, because their investment is highly proﬁtable. Their investment revenues are
large enough to cover the extra cost of external ﬁnance. Essentially this means that
16However, note that in a model with convex costs z
o has to be deﬁned somewhat diﬀerently. In
this case it is the capital imbalance at which a ﬁrm would not actively change the capital imbalance
by investing. Yet and although ﬁrms adjust their capital imbalance in the short-run towards this level,
outside its long run equilibrium level (where e is endogenuous) z
o is never actually reached by active
investment.
17See Gomes (2001), Bond and Meghir (1994), or Whited (1992) for details.
14internal ﬁnance and fundamental incentives are substitutes in the pecking-order model
with convex adjustment costs, in case the ﬁrm likes to invest for fundamental reasons.
By contrast, our model predicts them to be complements, larger liquidity increases the
likelihood of investment especially when there is much investment mandated. Since
∂i
∂z < 0, this expressed formally is ∂2i
∂z∂e < 0 in our model and ∂2i
∂z∂e ≥ 0 in the pecking-
order model.
Within our model, both, the debt-ceiling and the liquidity dependence of the cost of
capital shape investment decisions. Which of the two frictions is more important in the
data can be evaluated by comparing ∂i
∂z × ∂¯ z∗
∂e and ∂i
∂e. If only the liquidity dependence
were of importance, ∂i
∂z × ∂¯ z∗
∂e and ∂i
∂e should be close to equal. In this case a drop in the
equity ratio for example only raises the managerial discount factor. This is similar to an
increase in z, and implies that the typical investment project becomes smaller. Although
this also inﬂuences the investment frequency, this eﬀe c ti sj u s tt h ee ﬀect a marginal
change in z would have: smaller investment projects only pay at lower investment costs.
If the debt-ceiling is the important ﬁnancial friction, ∂i
∂e can be expected to exceed
∂i
∂z × ∂¯ z∗
∂e substantially. Here, liquidity corresponds to a number of investment options a
ﬁr mc a ne x p e c tt oh a v ea tm o s to v e rs o m eg i v e np e r i o do ft i m e .T h es m a l l e rt h en u m b e r
of options is, the larger the value of each option will be. This option value adds another
factor to the ﬁxed cost of adjusting the stock of capital.
All this means that we can discriminate between the various investment models
using ﬁrst- and higher-order derivatives. Thus, even if we later estimate the investment
function non-parametrically and even if the estimated derivatives have no structural
interpretation in the form of coeﬃcients of an adjustment-cost function, the estimates
allow to draw structural conclusions.
3 Empirical evidence
3.1 Measuring the capital imbalance
To test our model of interacting frictions, we need an empirical approach that also
nests alternative models. This precludes structural estimation, and forces us to rely on a
r e d u c e df o r mr e p r e s e n t a t i o no fo u rm o d e lo nt h el i n e so ft h et w o - s t e pm o d e lo fC a b a l l e r o
et al. (1995). In this two-step approach, ﬁrst the capital imbalance z is estimated
as a proxy of fundamental investment incentives. Thereafter, investment is regressed
on this proxy and on the equity ratio to obtain the (short-run) expected investment
function. This function is estimated employing non-parametric estimation techniques
and we primarily base our inference on non-parametric average derivative estimates.
15Although this strategy allows no direct inference about the parameters of the economic
primitives (e.g. the adjustment cost function), it still allows to discriminate as we have
just argued before.
Hence, the ﬁrst goal is to construct an estimator for the capital imbalance z. In
contrast to Caballero et al. (1995), it cannot be assumed that the desired capital is pro-
portional to the stock of capital K∗ that a plant would hold in the absence of adjustment
costs, since the capital market imperfection complicate the ﬁrm’s choice. The following
Lemma helps to simplify the problem.
Lemma 2 For all λ>0,z ∗ ¡
w,λe,λ−1z
¢
= z∗ (z,e,w), i.e. in determining the optimal
capital imbalance e and z enter multiplicatively.
Proof. Note that for those ﬁrms that invest (zo 6= z) in the right-hand side of (10) z
and e only appear in the restriction (zo,b o) ∈ Y (z,e,w). In Y however, et and zt enter
only multiplicatively.
Hence, z and e enter only multiplicatively in z∗. Taking logs of z and e (without
changing notation) and denoting all other logs as small letters, we then can rewrite
the optimal capital imbalance z∗,d e ﬁned in the previous chapter, as a function in two
arguments, (z + e) and w. Abusing notation slightly, we replace z∗(z,e,w) by z∗(z +
e,w).
Moreover, if we neglect the diﬀerent eﬀect of e and z on Ω(e,z) and hence on the
composition of ¯ z∗, then the average target capital imbalance ¯ z∗ can also be approximated
b yaf u n c t i o no ft h es u mo fz+e. We linearize ¯ z∗(z+e) with a ﬁrst order approximation
around ¯ z∗(0).18 This linearization yields, for the dynamically desired stock of capital ˜ k
(in logs):19
¯ z∗
i (zit + eit)=˜ kit − k∗
it = αi0 + βi(zit + eit−1). (21)
In this equation, the equity ratio eit−1 of the end-of-period t − 1 was substituted for e,
since it reﬂects the equity ratio in the opening balance of the company, which is e in our
model.
Still, zit has to be replaced by an observable. For an isoelastic production/sales
function (in logs: yit = ψ0
it + ψk
i kit) we obtain from the ﬁrst order condition for the
statically optimal stock of capital k∗
it:
k∗







18This means ﬁrms hold the static optimal stock of capital and hence K/K
∗ =1and z =l n( K/K
∗)=
0. Additionally this assumes that ﬁrms hold no debt. Thus e =l n( 1 )=0and e + z =0 .
19In Caballero and Engel (1999) for comparison, the optimal capital imbalance is a constant.
16In this equation c denotes log cost-of-capital and ψk
i is the reduced form elasticity of
sales to capital—when all other ﬂexibly adjusted factors have been partialed out. Now
combining (21) and (22) yields (allowing for a non-unit elasticity of k∗ with respect to





1−βi + θiξit − kit +
βi
1−βieit−1 (23)
In this equation ¯ z∗
it − zit gives the log diﬀerence between dynamically optimal capital
and the capital currently employed, which is approximately the investment rate i upon
adjustment. Hence, we might term ¯ z∗
it − zit mandated investment. If ﬁrms adjust their
stock of capital over time, we can expect the diﬀerence ¯ z∗
it − zit to be stationary, while
ξit and kit are most likely to be non-stationary. Additionally, the equity ratio eit in the
opening balance is predetermined. Consequently, there must be a cointegration relation




Although, we do not directly observe ψ0
it and ψk
i , there are various ways to estimate these
parameters, and this estimation builds the ﬁrst step of the total estimation procedure.





However, estimating this production function is problematic since productivity is non
stationary, capital is endogenous, adjustment is lumpy, and time-to-build makes a speciﬁc
dynamic model necessary. With a panel of medium length in the time dimension this
approach hence becomes infeasible.
As an alternative, we calculate ψk
i from average expenditure shares on machinery
αM,l a n dαK and labor αL a n dt h e no b t a i nψ0
it as the direct residual from (24). More-
over, on the basis of average expenditure shares we can replace sales yit by Mit
αM or witLit
αw ,
which are the ratios of the current expenditure for one production factor over its average
expenditure share. Then we obtain ˆ ψ
0
it = Mit
αM − ˆ ψ
k
i kit for example. This indirect pro-
cedure has been proposed by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2002). The appendix provides
more details on both, the direct and the indirect procedures.
Since all three alternatives give valid estimates of ξ, but since also every single
17procedure on its own has also its disadvantages, we generate the actual estimate of
ξit as the common factor of all three of them. Essentially, this means we assume every
single of the three values ξ
(j)






it = bjξit + η
(j)
it , (25)
and recover ξit by factor analysis. It turns out that there is indeed only one factor
common to all measures. Details are again available in the appendix.
3.2.2 Estimation of the long run relation
The second step of the analysis is the estimation of the cointegration relation that follows
from (23). Here we employ Phillips and Moon’s (1999) ”full-modiﬁed panel cointegra-
tion estimator” (henceforth PFM-OLS). This estimator is
√
nT-consistent, asymptotic
normal and corrects for possible endogeneity of the regressors.
A drawback of the PFM-OLS estimator is that it is formulated for balanced panels
with integrated regressors only. The data we have is an unbalanced panel and at least
for e we would rather assume it to be a predetermined I(0) process. However, the PFM-
OLS estimator is a generalization of the full-modiﬁed OLS estimator of Phillips and
Hansen (1990) and Phillips (1995) and hence we expect the results of Phillips (1995) to
carry over to the panel case as well, i.e. the estimator is
√
nT-consistent and asymptotic
normal for parameters of stationary regressors. The standard errors for an I(0) regressor
are calculated in analogy to the time-series case.
The PFM-OLS estimator involves the estimation of an average (long-run) covariance
matrix. This is obtained by generating covariance-matrix estimates for each single ﬁrm
following a Newey-West (1987) type approach and then averaging over ﬁrms. For the
actual estimation, we use a Bartlett-kernel with a bandwidth of
√
Ti+1, where Ti denotes
the number of observations per ﬁrm. However, we restrict the sample of ﬁrms to be used
for covariance estimation to ﬁrms with at least 8 consecutive observations.
The cointegration relation that we estimate follows directly from (23):
kit = αi + γt + θiξit + κieit−1 + uit, (26)
κ :=
βi




The error term u reﬂects the stationary cointegration error. The time-dummies γt have
been included since the data that will be used covers a period of large shocks to inﬂation,
so that measuring the cost of capital is problematic. However, assume that the cost of
capital diﬀer across ﬁrms only due to diﬀerent ﬁnance, κeit−1, and time invariant, ﬁrm
18speciﬁcf a c t o r s ,αi, or time speciﬁcf a c t o r s ,γt. Then our estimation will reﬂect the cost
of capital correctly, since γt and αi are removed by two-way within transformations.20
With the estimate of θ at hand, we can use (22) to calculate end-of-period t capital
imbalances ˆ zit = uit. This capital imbalance, evaluated at the end of the previous period
b zit−1, can serve as a proxy for the capital imbalance zt a tt h eb e g i n n i n go ft h ep e r i o dt.
3.2.3 Estimation of the investment function
In the third estimation step, we express the expected investment rate ijt as a func-
tion of (ejt−1,b zjt−1), which has to be estimated non-parametrically. To compare the
short- and long-run behavior, average derivatives of i(z,e) are estimated. These are the
counterparts to the coeﬃcients in linear models.
The employed nonparametric estimation procedure is local linear kernel estimation.
However, with non-parametric estimators it is not as straightforward to account for ﬁrm-
speciﬁce ﬀects as it is in the parametric case (Ullah and Roy, 1998). To account for ﬁxed
eﬀects the investment function shall meet the following assumption:





Moreover, we assume E(i(·,·)) = 0 to identify i and deﬁne generally x+
jt as the
two-way within transformed variable x to remove ﬁxed time and individual eﬀects.
Under this assumption function i can be directly estimated from the within-transformed
data employing standard non-parametric local linear estimation. This technique is best
understood as a weighted least squares (WLS) estimation whose weights are generated
by a kernel function that measures the distance of observations to the point at which
the function is locally estimated.
3.2.4 Estimation of average derivatives of the investment function
A major drawback of the nonparametric estimators are their wide conﬁdence bounds.
Because of this, we also estimate average derivatives of i(z,e), which allow to draw more
reliable conclusions as their conﬁdence bounds are relatively close. This is because non-
parametric average derivative estimators converge with parametric rates of convergence
(Rilstone, 1991).
Several nonparametric estimators for average derivatives are available in our panel
data setting (Ullah and Roy, 1998). Again, we concentrate on derivative estimates from
20Note that this also controls for diﬀerent baseline access to capital markets.













it produces two candidates for derivative estimates. We can either numerically generate




as a direct estimates for the
derivatives.
The pointwise derivative estimators, b∗∗ are asymptotically normally distributed. Its
small samples bias diﬀers from that of b∗ i ns u c hw a yt h a ti nm o s tc a s e st h en u m e r i c a l
estimator b∗ is preferable (Ullah and Roy, 1998). However, this estimator has a not yet
known variance (Pagan and Ullah, 1999). Therefore, we use both estimators, but have
to rely on the direct estimator b∗∗ for inference.21
Average derivative estimates are generated as the mean of the pointwise estimates.
When we calculate average derivatives over a subset of observations we calculate them as
the mean of those observations that fall into the subsample. We do not re-estimate with
only the observations from the subsample. The cross- and higher-order-derivatives are
computed as numerical estimates. Just as for the numerical estimator of the ﬁrst-order
derivative the asymptotic variance is not yet known for average higher-order-derivative
estimates.
3.3 Data
The data we employ comes from the BSO-dataset of the Cambridge/DTI Database.22
This database contains annual accounting data from UK companies from 1976 to 1990.
Observations of 50494 company-years are included in the data. About half of them are of
manufacturing ﬁrms. For the subsequent analysis the dataset has been restricted to com-
panies of the manufacturing sector with positive ﬁxed capital and positive equity. Out of
these, we only keep those ﬁrms that report a complete series of employee remuneration,
since we are otherwise unable to infer capital productivity from the data. Moreover,
21Additionally, for panel data there is the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator of Ullah and Roy (1998) available.
Just as b
∗ and b
∗∗ under assumption 5, this estimator b
FE uses the within transformed data for the
regression. However, it calculates the weights with the kernel on the basis of the original data. By
contrast, the estimators b
∗ and b
∗∗ use also the within transformed data to evaluate the kernel. The
advantage of the ﬁxed-eﬀects estimator is that assumption 5 could be replaced. Instead the estimator
assumes that the investment function exhibits ﬁxed idiosyncratic eﬀects is otherwise homogenous among
the ﬁrms in the not transformed data. The downside of this estimator is that bias behavior and variance
are unknown. Experimenting with this estimator in a previous version of paper produced no qualitatively
ddiﬀerent results.
22See Goudi et al., 1985. The database is freely available by HMSO after registration. It covers a
representative sample of UK company accounts. The same databas has for example recently been used
by Geroski et al. (2003) to test Gibrat’s law.
20the sample is restricted to ﬁrms with 7 or more consecutive observations to make the
cointegration analysis sensible. Additionally we drop those ﬁrms whose equity ratio (in
logs) in any period of time diﬀered from the sample mean by 5.5 times the standard
deviation or from the ﬁrm speciﬁc mean by 3.5 times the standard deviation. Also we
drop those ﬁrms whose investment rate diﬀered by 7 times the standard deviation from
the mean. The former selection removes in particular ﬁrms with extremely low values of
equity and ﬁrms with extreme changes in the ﬁnancial structure. The latter removes, in
particular, ﬁrms that exhibit investment spikes that are too large to be neither outlier
nor measurement error. Together this two selections remove 274 observations.
We choose relatively large bounds to remove outliers to avoid to much of a selection
bias. In particular, we are conservative in removing outliers on the basis of the investment
rate since investment rates will by nature be heavily dispersed with ﬁxed adjustment
cost. Hence, large investment spikes do not necessarily mean outliers. Altogether the
selection reduces the sample size substantially to 6272 observations from 631 diﬀerent
ﬁrms, but it should be noted that most of the removed observations are removed due to
missing data or due to a too small number of observations.
The BSO dataset contains capital and investment data for land and buildings as well
as for other tangible assets (e.g. tools and machinery). Since reported depreciation rates
for machinery are about 50%, we restrict the investment analysis to land and buildings.23
Besides the more modest depreciation rates of land and buildings the greater ex ante
appropriateness of the ﬁxed adjustment cost model also favors land and buildings as the
investment good to be analyzed. The data on machinery is only used to infer factor
productivity.
All data that we use have been inﬂated to 1996 prices with the price index for
producer output taken from the International Financial Statistics database of the IMF.
The capital series have been generated using the perpetual inventory method, taking the
reported capital in the ﬁrst period of observation as a starting value. Details on how the
data items are constructed are available in the appendix.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for those variables of the sample that we use.
For the data on investment in land and building we ﬁnd the following. When a cut-oﬀ
value of a net-investment rate of 30% is used to indicate an investment spike,24 19% of
all ﬁrm years exhibit such spike. On average, these spikes account for 39% of each ﬁrm’s
23Although our model might still hold true for fast depreciating capital goods, we would need data at
a higher frequency to sensibly analyse the data. At a depreciation rate of 50% capital goods are replaced
on average every second year on a regular basis, if the stock of capital stays constant. Hence, we can
expect to hardly ﬁnd any inﬂuence of ﬁxed costs in yearly data.
24Net-investment rate here means investment rate over the ﬁrm average depreciation rate.
21Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, Unit Root Tests and Spike and Inactivity Indicators
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
capital productivity, ξ, common factor 6272 -0.000 1.029 -4.921 3.564
land and buildings, k (logs) 6272 9.777 1.633 1.608 15.579
equity ratio, e (logs) 6272 -0.242 0.334 -2.404 1.272
investment rate, i 6272 0.336 0.539 -0.837 8.177
sales, y (log) 6272 11.571 1.508 4.106 16.640
remuneration, wL (log) 6272 9.949 1.517 0.639 14.971
machinery M (log) 6272 10.274 1.614 3.637 16.069
R e s u l t so faB r e i t u n gM e y e rT e s t
variable coeﬃcient (ρ-1) std. error lags
k, (a) 0.0604 0.008 1
k, (b) 0.0188 0.009 1
ξ, (a) 0.0548 0.008 1
ξ, (b) 0.0421 0.009 1
e, (a) -0.0431∗∗∗ 0.017 2
e, (b) -0.0800∗∗∗ 0.017 2
cointegration error
z -0.0223∗∗ 0.010 1
Activities in %
average depreciation rate 15.0
percentage of spikes 18.5
percentage of inactivity 14.7
percentage of disinvestment 4.7
fraction of total investment
accounted for by spikes 39.3
∗∗∗,∗∗ signiﬁcant rejection of the unit root
on the 1% / 2% level, one-sided test (ρ − 1) < 0
(a) without / (b) with time dummy,
augmentation lags: sequential t-test max=4, min=1
investment activity over the total observation period. On the other hand 15% of all
ﬁrm years show a gross-investment rate of less than 5% in absolute terms, so that there
also is substantial evidence for inactivity. Active disinvestment (less than -5% gross-
investment rate) is observed only rarely (in less than 5% of all cases). Therefore on a
priori grounds, the assumption of ﬁxed adjustment costs or irreversibility of investment
seems to be relatively plausible for the DTI data on land and buildings.
For the equity ratio, we see a substantial number of ﬁrms holding more liquid assets
than having outstanding debt (appr. 16% of all observations), so that they are eﬀectively
lenders and their log equity ratio is positive. Hence, these companies seem to be more
"patient" than the market or gain some additional value from retaining earnings, for
example greater ﬂexibility as in our model.
Since Cooper and Willis (2004) have highlighted the importance of the unit-root
assumption for productivity in ﬁxed adjustment cost models, we pretest this assumption.
The results of a Breitung-Meyer (1994) test for unit roots in panel data are also reported
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26 PFM -0.07 0.51∗∗∗
OLS 0.01 0.54∗∗∗
Industry κb θ
33 PFM 0.02 1.18∗∗∗
OLS -0.06 1.19∗∗∗
36 PFM 0.09 1.28∗∗∗
OLS 0.13∗∗ 1.18∗∗∗
48 PFM -0.05 0.54∗∗∗
OLS -0.04 0.67∗∗∗
aThe standard errors are obtain as panel analogues to Phillips (1995, p. 1038, eq. (14)).
b ∗∗
∗∗∗ s u p e r s c r i p tr e f e r st oI ( 1 )a n ds u b s c r i p tt oI ( 0 )s t a n d a r de r r o r sf o rt h eP F Me s t i m a t o rf o rκ,
c OLS: Usual panel corrected SE, ∗∗,∗∗∗ denote signiﬁcance on the 5% and 1% level respectively.
in table 1.25 The analyzed series are capital (land and buildings) productivity ξ∗, capital
k, the equity ratio e and the gap z. While productivity and capital both seem to be
integrated of order 1, both e and the gap z (cointegration error) are stationary, at least
once we control for time-eﬀects.
3.4 Estimation results for the target (long run) capital imbalance
Table 2 reports estimates of the cointegration equation (26) for the whole dataset as
well as for those industries for which more than 450 observations are available. These
industries are food [21], drink [23], chemicals [26], mechanical engineering [33], electrical
engineering [36] and paper, printing & publishing [48].
The estimated long-run elasticity of capital with respect to the ξ is 0.913. Since ξ has,
due to normalization, only 2/3 of the variance of the original measures from which it is
constructed, the theoretical prediction for θ would be approximately 1.5, from which the
estimate signiﬁcantly deviates. However, the result that is more striking is that ﬁnance
measured by the equity ratio has not only no statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the
level of the capital stock, but also that the estimated coeﬃcient ˆ κ is virtually zero.26
When we look at the sample stratiﬁed by industries the result does not substantially
change. In almost all cases ﬁnance has no signiﬁcant inﬂuence. Only for industry 23
(and 36 based on OLS results) would we conclude that more ﬁnancial means increase the
stock of capital a company wishes to hold. Strangely the I(0) standard errors calculated
as panel analogies to Phillips (1995, p. 1038) are smaller than the I(1) errors calculated
25The Breitung Meyer test has been chosen, since the panel is much larger along the cross sectional
dimension than along the time dimension and is also unbalanced. The test accounts for both ﬁxed
individual eﬀects and cross-sectional correlation and is an "N-asymptotic" test.
26Note that this is not a result of e being stationary. Since the cointegration error z is stationary κ is
identiﬁed also asymptotically, see Phillips (1995).
23under the assumption of superconsistency.
Going back to the results that we obtained under the assumption of a homogeneous
panel, the ﬁnding that κ is zero has an important statistical implication for the analysis
of investment behavior that follows. For q-models of investment it has been argued by
a number of authors that a statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence of cash-ﬂow on investment
might result from the inability to measure future proﬁtability of investment correctly. As
a result cash ﬂow actually predicts proﬁtability but its statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence
in investment does not identify ﬁnancial market imperfections. A series of papers have
followed that idea and replaced the stock market value of a company by analysts’ fore-
casts of company’s earnings in the q regressions. These papers then ﬁnd no additional
role of cash ﬂow in investment, see Cummins et al. (1999) and Bond and Cummins
(2001) and Bond et al. (2004).27 Since in our approach the equity ratio does not explain
the capital choice of a company in the long run once we control for productivity ξ,in turn
e can also not contain any information on the long run proﬁtability of investment which
is not included in ξ.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,i fw eﬁnd an inﬂuence of ﬁnance e in investment later
on, we cannot attribute it to picking up long run investment prospects.
3.5 Investment behavior
3.5.1 Density and conditional expectations estimates
With the cointegration estimates it is now possible to construct the time series b zit for
each ﬁrm. We standardize i,e and z for the non-parametric analysis. To obtain a ﬁrst
graphical idea of the investment data, the densities of i,e and z and the conditional
density of the investment rate f (i|z) are estimated. The results are displayed in ﬁgures
2 and 3 (a). In these estimations and in all following estimations a normal product kernel
is used. For the density estimation, a variable bandwidth is used, which we generate
using an adaptive two-stage estimator (e.g. Pagan and Ullah, 1999, p. 13), where the
preliminary density estimate is parametric normal. The overall bandwidth for variable
j, hj, is selected by Silverman’s (1986) interquartile rule of thumb, with interquartile
range Rj, the number of observations n =5 6 7 4(we loose one year because we take the






The investment rate and the equity ratio distributions show substantial excessive
kurtosis, while the capital imbalances z are closer to normally distributed. When we
look at the distribution of i conditional on z displayed in ﬁgure 3(a), we ﬁnd both for
ﬁrms with large and with small mandated investment two peaks in the distribution, one
27However, similar to our results on investment later on , Bond et al. (2004) still ﬁnd a role for the
cash holdings of a company in determining the ﬁrms investment activity.
24Figure 2: Non-parametric density estimates, i, e, and z








































































associated with adjustment, the other with inactivity. However, these two peaks are
only clearly marked on the boundary of the support, where the estimator becomes less
reliable.
Now, we turn towards the estimation of the expected investment function. As ex-
plained, we use a local linear estimation technique. Again the bandwidth chosen is a
ﬂexible bandwidth, here following Fan and Gijbels (1992), where bandwidth h(xi)=
hf (xi)
−1/5 and f is the density of the standard normal distribution. The common con-
stant h is determined such as to minimize the mean integrated squared error. This results
for variable j in a bandwidth hj = a
1/6











j (xi) is the second-order derivative of investment with respect to variable j. We
estimate this derivative on the basis of a fourth order polynomial that is estimated with
OLS; ˆ σ2
u is the variance of the OLS residual. Using diﬀerent bandwidth within a certain
range, produced no substantially diﬀerent estimation results.
Figure 3(b) displays the estimated investment function. For the display the argu-
ments and the investment rate have been transformed back to the non-standardized
scale. Moreover note, that the scale for z runs from positive values (low mandated
investment) on the left to negative values (high mandated investment) on the right.
The investment function is nonlinear in a twofold sense. First, there is some inter-
action of fundamental investment incentives z and ﬁnance e. If mandated investment is
large (negative z), more equity increases the slope of the investment function, so that
it reacts more strongly to changes in z, the fundamental investment incentive. On the
other hand, if the ﬁrm fundamentally should decrease the stock of capital, more equity
makes the ﬁrm more reluctant to adjust, and the ﬁrm sells less than it does with low
equity. Recall that this corresponds to our analysis of the inﬂuence of ﬁnance on the
































































(b) expected investment rate i(z,e)
Figure 4: Local linear estimate of an additive seperable investment function, i(z,e) =
m(z) + m(e)



























medium equity  low equity  high equity 
critical size of adjustment costs (15) and hence to a frequency eﬀect as of (20).
Secondly, the investment function appears convex for negative z and somewhat con-
cave for positive z,which corresponds to incentives to invest or to sell capital respectively.
This curvature is a central prediction of non-convex adjustment cost models. So far, the
non-linearity we ﬁnd only for the point-estimates whose conﬁdence bounds are wide—as
typical for non-parametric estimations.
One way to increase the accuracy of the regressions is to impose more structure, for
example a certain functional form. However, this will result in biased estimates if the
functional form is misspeciﬁed. A potential form of such misspeciﬁcation bias can be
seen in ﬁgure 4, note that the scale for z has also been reversed. There we estimate the
26Table 3: Average gradient of the investment rate i(e,z)
Number of observations: N =5 6 4 1 std. deviation
derivative b ¯ b
∗ b ¯ b
∗∗
for b ¯ b
∗∗
bz -0.6841 -0.6697 0.0065
be 0.1584 0.1414 0.0128
generalized additive model (see Pagan and Ullah, 1999, pp.137)
E[i|(z,e)] = m1(z)+m2(e). (29)
In this model there is no interaction of equity and capital-imbalance and thus this source
of non-linearity that we found in ﬁgure 3 (b) is removed. Two results are apparent
eﬀe c t so ft h i ss p e c i ﬁcation. First, the investment rate seems more or less linear in the
capital imbalance and secondly when we look at equity, those ﬁrms with low equity that
might be considered most constrained are least reactive to changes in ﬁnance, a "fact"
ﬁrstly emphasized by Kaplan and Zingales (1997). However, when we look at average
derivatives, which is an alternative way to alleviate the problem of wide conﬁdence
bounds of non-parametric estimation, these ﬁndings appear to be an artifact generated
by misspeciﬁcation.
3.5.2 Average derivative estimates
These average derivative estimates for both estimators are reported in table 3. Note,
that all variables have been standardized (divided by their standard deviation sx)f o r
t h ee s t i m a t i o n .T h er e p o r t e dd e r i v a t i v e sa r et r a n s f o r m e db a c kt ot h eo r i g i n a ls c a l eb y
multiplying the derivative with respect to z or e with si
sz and si
se respectively (ratios
of standard deviations of i and z or e). Although both estimators yield quantitatively
slightly diﬀerent estimates, they qualitatively do not diﬀer: Both the equity-ratio and the
capital imbalance z have a signiﬁcant eﬀect. If the true model were a partial adjustment
model with linear error-correction i = βz (k − k∗)+βee, then we should have obtained
a long run relation of ∂k∗
∂e = −
βe
βz ≈ 0.23, since the cointegrating vector corresponds to
the space of zero adjustment.
Table 4 displays the average derivatives for subsamples stratiﬁed according to in
which terzile e or z fall.28 Since the non-parametric average derivative estimators con-
verge with a parametric speed of convergence, the standard errors increase due to the
28We do not include top and bottom 0.5% observations in the ﬁrst and third terzile to avoid potential
problems at the boundary of their support.
27Table 4: Average derivatives for single-dimensionally stratiﬁed subsamples
stratiﬁed according to z
z high z medium z low
bz -0.5821 -0.5207 -0.9077
be 0.1620 0.0889 0.1748
stratiﬁed according to e
e low e medium e high
bz -0.6321 -0.6426 -0.7226
be 0.1074 0.1691 0.1442
standard errors equal approximately 1.74 times the full-sample errors
Derivatives are direct estimates ¯ b∗∗
stratiﬁcation only by factor
√
3.
The ﬁr s tp a r to ft h et a b l es t r a t i ﬁes the sample according to z, going from low man-
dated investment (high z) to high mandated investment (low z). The ﬁrst row of the table
displays ∂i
∂z and provides strong evidence that non-convex adjustment cost matter in the
investment decision. It shows that investment reacts most strongly to z when mandated
investment is large (low z) and that it reacts least strongly to mandated investment if z
takes intermediate values.
The second row of the table displays ∂i
∂e. Here it shows that the inﬂuence of ﬁnance
on investment is pronounced if z takes either very high or very low values. In the light of
our model, this makes a lot of sense: If the main impact of ﬁnance comes via investment
frequency, the absolute size of this impact can only be large when adjustments are also
large.
That for both, low and high z, ∂i
∂e is positive relates to the reaction of ¯ w to changes
in e.W h e n z is low, more liquidity increases the threshold ¯ w for adjustment costs up
to which a ﬁrm adjusts. By contrast, more liquidity will lower ¯ w when z is large. The
former eﬀect leads to more upward adjustment, whereas the latter leads to less downward
adjustment, so that both increase the investment rate.
Overall however, larger ﬁnancial means increase the adjustment speed, − ∂i
∂z, as we
can see from the ﬁrst row of the second part of table. Moreover, in contrast to the results
we had obtained from the generalized additive model as in ﬁgure 4 there is no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in the inﬂuence of ﬁnance between low equity and high equity ﬁrms.
The impression from the diﬀerences in ﬁrst order derivatives is also validated by
looking at the average estimated Hessian displayed in table 5. The estimates are gener-
ated as numerical estimates and again we stratify the sample along z. The table reports
the Hessian for z coming from the ﬁrst and third terzile. When mandated investment is
large (low z),i n v e s t m e n ti is convex in z and i is concave for low mandated investment.
Moreover, the cross derivative is negative in the former and positive in the latter case.
Taking into account that −z measures mandated investment, this means ﬁnance and
28Table 5: Average Hessian
low z (high incentive) high z (low incentive)
ze z e
z 0.5767 -0.0325 -0.1473 0.1310
e -0.0352 0.2947 0.1310 0.0613
Derivatives are numerical estimates ¯ b∗
fundamentals are complements for those ﬁrms with large mandated investments. An
increase in equity has the same eﬀect on the ﬁrst-order derivative ∂i
∂z that an increase in
mandated investment has.
4C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper a model of investment that incorporates an imperfect capital market and
ﬁx e di n v e s t m e n tc o s t sw a sp r e s e n t e d . E v e nt h o u g hn oc l o s e df o r mw a sd e d u c e ds o m e
new results were obtained by analyzing that model. The major result is to identify
the diﬀerence between a short-run eﬀect of liquidity on the frequency of investment
and a long-run eﬀect on the optimal stock of capital. While models that generate a
liquidity ﬁnance correlation via agency or strategic motives—for example Myers (1977) or
Brander and Lewis (1986)—predict the inﬂuence of ﬁnance through the stock of capital,
t h em o d e li nt h i sp a p e rr a t h e re m p h a s i z e sa na l t e r n a t i v ee ﬀect via the frequency of
investment projects. This suggests a stronger short-run than long-run inﬂuence of ﬁnance
in investment, and empirically we ﬁnd exactly this.
In particular, the investment rate is found to be a nonlinear function, where in-
vestment opportunities (capital imbalance) and ﬁnance (equity ratio) strongly interact.
Imposing only additive separability in estimating this function already leads to a severe
error. This error could well be the cause of the puzzling ﬁnding reported in the literature
that ”ap r i o r iunconstrained” ﬁrms react more strongly to changes in their ﬁnancial vari-
ables than constrained ones. For further empirical research, this result suggest a need
for ﬂexible functional approaches, for example to estimate investment equations in a
generalized error correction framework as done in this paper.29
Within this wide class of generalized error correction methods, our approach was
completely non-parametric for the short-run dynamics (or error correction function).
We generated accuracy of the estimates by relying only on average derivative estimates.
An alternative were to take a ﬂexible but parametric approach to generalize the error-
correction process. This might provide further insights. In particular our estimation
29See de Jong (2001) for an overview on generalized error-correction methods.
29is unable to recover the economic primitives of the investment decision. Though our
empirical method can rule out some model alternatives, still a whole class of investment
models might generate the observed dynamics. Yet, indirect inference methods may help
to identify the economic primitives on the basis of our reduced form estimations.30
From a policy perspective, our ﬁndings have some implications again without recov-
ering economic primitives. Suppose there are shocks to the balance sheet positions of
ﬁrms—for example through exchange rates as in Céspedes et al. (2004), Aghion et al.
(2001) or Devereux and Lane (2001)—then this paper’s model predicts the real impact
of such shocks to have a diﬀerent timing and impact than the usual ﬁnancial accelerator
model of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Bernanke et al. (1998). Productive ﬁrms will
delay investments, unproductive ones are more likely to sell capital to repay debt. The
total eﬀect comes much more up front than over time.
Moreover, the total impact will depend on the distribution of capital imbalance in
the economy. If there is no aggregate capital imbalance but some ﬁrms need to increase
their stock of capital, while others need to sell capital, a deterioration of balance sheets
will lead to a drop in investment. By contrast, in the same aggregate situation the same
d e t e r i o r a t i o nw i l ll e a dt on os t r o n gr e a c t i o ni fa l s on os i n g l eﬁrm has a marked capital
imbalance. Thus, if ﬁxed adjustment costs are present, policies that inﬂuence the bal-
ance sheet will be rated diﬀerently depending on the distribution of capital imbalances.
Therefore, with ﬁnancial frictions, policy makers, for example central banks, need to
observe the distribution of capital-imbalances even more than with only ﬁxed adjust-
ment in order to predict policy implications. More speciﬁcally the eﬀects of ﬁnance and
fundamentals cannot be considered separately as the magnitude of each eﬀect depends
on the state of the other variable.
Another example for policy implications would be a (corporate) tax reform. There
the implications on the costs of retaining earnings have to be taken into account,too.
Since a rise in the average equity ratio, not only raises investment in the short run, but
also increases the propensity to adjust it may increase eﬃciency, as capital imbalances
become smaller.
30See for example Cooper and Willis (2003). However the recent contribution of Bayer (2004) to the
debate on gap regressions initiated by Cooper and Willis (2004) raises some concern about the feasibility
of such approach, in particular for macro-data.
305 Appendix
In this appendix, we ﬁrst derive the Bellman equation which is central to our model.
Thereafter, we show the existence and uniqueness of a solution to this equation. Then,
some properties of the induced optimal-policy function are discussed. Finally a data
appendix follows.
5.1 Deriving the Bellman Equation
5.1.1 Constraint set
All variables, functions etc. are deﬁned as in the main text, unless stated diﬀerently.
The correspondence, X, of ﬁnancial feasible capital-imbalance and debt pairs is given by
X (K∗
t ,w t,z t,B t)=
n
zo,B t+1 ∈ R2
+|D(zo,B t+1,K∗





The ﬁrst constraint is the positive dividend constraint the latter reﬂects the debt ceiling.
Dividends are given as in the main text by
D = Π(zo
t,K∗
t ) − A(zo
t,K∗
t ,w t)I{zo
t 6=zt} − K∗
t (zo
t − zt)+Bt+1 − (1 + r(bt))Bt. (31)

































t = bozo. And for Bt
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btzt (1 − δ)

















zt − (1 − bo)zo (34)
Now we introduce our short hand notation for the equity ratio












= π(zo)[1 − wtI{zo6=zt}]+e(bt)zt − (1 − bo)zo (36)
This allows us to deﬁne X in relative terms as
ˆ X (K∗
t ,w t,z t,b t): =
(
zo,b o ∈ R++ × R+
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
π(zo)[1 − wtI{zo6=zt}]+e(bt)zt




Since r is a continuous increasing function, e is a one-to-one mapping. Since ˆ X
is independent of K∗
t ,w ed e ﬁne the positive part of ˆ X as a correspondence only in
(zt,C,w t):
Y (zt,C,w t): =
n
zo,b o ∈ R++ × R+




For et = e(bt) and C = etzt we have ˆ X = Y ∪ {(0,0)}. Note that in this appendix we
slightly diﬀer in notation from the main text, when denoting the equity argument of Y
and v later. Here we use only the compound C = ez, whereas in the main text we only
have the equity ratio. We can do this replacement because of Lemma 2. This ’trick’ will




is diﬀerentiable with respect to b.
Lemma 3 (Lemma 1 main text) (a) Y is non-empty and
( b )e m p l o y i n gz e r oc a p i t a li ss u b o p t i m a l ,i . e .
max
(zo,bt)∈Y
˜ v(zo,b t) − π(zo)wtI{zo6=zt} >ψ Et[v(wt+1,0,0) > 0
Proof. (a) Because of Assumption 2 et ≥ 0, By deﬁnition z ≥ 0 so that also etzt ≥ 0
holds. Thus to prove (a), it is suﬃcient to show, that the company can repay all debt,
bt, by selling all its capital. Than it reinstalls a small amount of capital z(wt) for which
it pays only from current earnings although it suﬀers from the stop in production:
∃z(wt):z − π(z)[1 − wtI{z6=zt}] ≤ 0.
Because lim
x→0
π0(x)=+ ∞ by assumption and
π(x)
x ≥ π0(x) since π is concave , this ”self-
ﬁnancing” z always exists.
(b) If the ﬁrm opts to stop production, it sells all capital, pays back debt and pays the
32rest—its equity—out as dividend. Using z from part (a) a ﬁrm can always pay out all
equity and still set bt+1 = bo =0as well. Moreover, this means the company will start
with a positive value of equity in the next period. Now it can again sell z and pays this
out as a dividend and then is in exactly the same situation as the company that had
chosen (0,0) in the previous period, but it can pay a dividend that is z units larger. This






¯ ¯ ¯π(z)+C − (1 − bo)z ≥ 0 ≥ bo −ˆ b
o
(39)
and Y ∗ (C,w): =
n
zo,b o ∈ R++ × R+




One can easily verify that for C = ez, Y = Y ∗∪({z}×Z). Moreover, due to the concavity
of π both Y ∗ and Z are convex-valued, the union Y however may be not.
5.1.2 Value function
N o wd e n o t et h ev a l u eo faﬁrm by V.For notational convenience deﬁne Y := Y (zt,C(zt,b t),w t),
C = zte(bt) and drop the arguments of ˆ X and Y.
V is determined by the following Bellman equation.
V (K∗




t ,w t,z t,b t)+ψEt
£
V (K∗
t+1,w t+1,z t+1,b o)
¤ª
(41)
Now, divide both sides by K∗





t =m a x
(zo,bo)∈Y
n








= e(bt)zt +m a x
(zo,bo)∈Y
n











The second equality stems from the fact, that e(bt)zt is not a function of (zo,b o) and is
thus not aﬀected by the maximization.
Finally, subtract e(bt)zt from both sides and add e(bo)zt+1 − e(bo)zt+1 in the ex-
33pectations operator. Using v = V
K∗ − e(bt)zt then yields























v(zt,C,w t)= m a x
(zo,bo)∈Y
(

















t =e x p ( ξt+1) and
zo(1 − δ)=















That maximizing v indeed leads to an equivalent policy to maximizing V has been
intuitively explained in the main text.
5.2 Existence and uniqueness




max{vno adj (z,C),v adj (C,w)}
vadj(C,w)
for Z 6= ∅
for Z = ∅
(46)
with
vno adj (z,C): = m a x
bo∈Z(z,C)
(













vadj(C,w): = m a x
(zo,bo)∈Y ∗(C,w)
(














Assumption 6: µξ := ψEt[exp(ξt+1)] < 1.31
31This assumption is equivalent to assumption A.6 in Caballero and Engel (199, p. 811). Assume ξ
is normally distributed with variance σ







Approximately, this is r−d>
σ2
2 . Economically this means that productivity and hence value of a given
stock of capital grows at a smaller rate than the market rate of return.
Suppose this assumption did not hold and neglect adjustment costs for the moment. It is easy to see
that a ﬁrm could obtain inﬁnite expected value by choosing a stock of capital that is small enough to
34Deﬁnition 1 Let T be deﬁned by posing (Tv)(z,C,w) e q u a lt ot h er i g h th a n ds i d eo f
( 4 5 ) . T h i so p e r a t o ri sd e ﬁned on the set B of all real-valued, almost everywhere (a.e.)
continuous and bounded functions with domain D = R++ × R+ × [0,1]
Lemma 4 The mapping T preserves boundedness,
Proof. To show that T preserves boundedness, one has to show that for any bounded
function u (Tu)(·) is bounded. Consider u ∈ B, that is bounded from above by u and
bounded from below by u,t h e n(Tu)(·) is bounded from above because
(Tu)(z,C,w) ≤ µξu +s u p
(zo,bo)∈Y
n
π(zo)[1 − wtI{zo6=zt}] − (1 − bo)zo + ψ(1 − δ)e(bo)zo
o
≤ µξu +s u p
0≤zo,0≤bo≤ b
{π(zo) − (1 − bo)zo + ψ(1 − δ)e(bo)zo}
= µξu +s u p
0≤zo,0≤bo≤ b
{[1 − ψ(1 + r(bo))]bozo + π(zo) − (1 − ψ(1 − δ))zo}
≤ µξu +s u p
0≤zo,0≤bo≤ b
{(1 − ψ)zo + π(zo) − (1 − ψ(1 − δ))zo}
= µξu +s u p
0≤zo
{π(zo) − ψδzo} (47)





The second inequality results from dropping adjustment costs.
With the deﬁnition of e(b) we obtain the ﬁrst equality. The third inequality now follows
from dropping r and r(bo) ≥ 0, and thereafter replacing bo by 1 since 1 ≤ b b<1.The last
supremum is bounded, because π(zo)−ψδzo obtains its maximum. This follows from our
concavity assumption on π and our assumption on the ﬁrst derivative of π that leads to
lim
zo→0
π0(zo) − ψδ > 0 > lim
zo→∞
π0(zo) − ψδ.
In fact inequality (47) states that the value of a company is always less than the maximum
value the company can obtain in the next period plus the static maximum proﬁt.
That (Tu)(·) is bounded from below follows from
(Tu)(z,ze,w) ≥ µξu +s u p
(zo,bo)∈Y
©
π(zo)[1 − wtI{zo6=zt}] − (1 − bo)zo + ψ(1 − δ)e(bo)zoª
>µ ξu.
reproduce its depreciation plus the interest rate in the ﬁrst period. In the next period it can be expected,
that this stock of capital (depreciated capital replaced) generates a positive proﬁt, which grows at a larger
rate than the interest rate. In this sense, assumption 6 is an equilibrium condition for the capital-market.
35The last inequality follows directly from Lemma 3.1—the optimality of no-bankruptcy.
Lemma 5 T preserves almost everywhere (a.e.) continuity, in particular for any a.e.
continuous function uT(u) is continuous everywhere outside A := {(z,C)|C =( 1 −
b b)z − π(z)}.
Proof. For every u that is bounded and continuous a.e. parameter integrals in
(45) are continuous in zo,b o. Together with the other parts being continuous, the whole
maximized function. Since, both Y and Z are continuous correspondences except for
the (z,C)-pairs in A := {(z,C)|C =( 1 − b b)z − π(z)}, the maximization fulﬁlls the
assumptions of Berge’s theorem at all points outside A. A is the set of points at which
Z switches to being empty, it is those (z,e) pairs at which a marginal decrease in equity
will force the ﬁrm to adjust capital to avoid bankruptcy.
With Berge’s theorem, (Tu)(z,C,w) must be continuous for all points (z,C) / ∈ A. Now,
A is a curve in R2 a n ds oh a sm e a s u r e0.T h u s ,(Tu) is continuous a.e.
Lemma 6 T satisﬁes Blackwell’s condition.
Proof. First notes that if f1,f 2 ∈ B and if ∀(z,C,w) ∈ D : f1(z,C,w) ≤ f2(z,C,w),
then (because exp(d+ξ) > 0) the expected value in (46) preserves the inequality, and so
does the max-function. Thus
(Tf1)(z,C,w) ≤ (Tf2)(z,C,w).
Straightforward algebra shows that
(Tf+ a)(z,C,w)=( Tf)(z,C,w)+µξa
Assumption A.6 now yields the second Blackwell condition.
Proposition 1 Equation (45) has exactly one solution (which belongs to B).
Proof. L e m m a s4t o6y i e l d st h a tTd e ﬁnes a contraction mapping on the metric
space B with a modulus strictly smaller than one. The existence and uniqueness now
follows from the contraction mapping theorem (See Theorem 3.2 in Stockey, Lucas and
Prescott, 1989)
365.3 Optimal policy













Lemma 7 I(z,b) is analytic in z and b and is hence diﬀerentiable of all order, if e(b)
is analytic
Proof. Note that I can be written as a convolution of an continuous function K and
an o r m a ld e n s i t y :
I(z,C): =ψ
Z
K(lnz − ξ,lnC − ξ)exp(ξ)dF(ξ)
K(s,u): =
Z
v(exp(s +l n( 1 − δ)),exp(u +l n( 1 − δ)), )dG( )
K is continuous as it is a parameter integral, with a bounded and a.e. continuous kernel.
Since the convolution of a normal density and a continuous function is analytic (see e.g.
Theorem 9 on p. 59 in Lehmann (1986)), I is analytic in both arguments and hence it
is analytic in z,a n da l s oi nb if e(b) is analytic.
Note that we can now express vno adj. and vadj. in terms of I as
vno adj. (z,C)=π(z)+ m a x
bo∈Z(z,C)
(ψ(1 − δ)e(bo) − (1 − bo))z + I (z,bo) (49)
vadj (C,w): = m a x
(zo,bo)∈Y ∗(C,w)
{π(zo)(1 − w) − (1 − bo)zo + ψ(1 − δ)e(bo)zo + I (zo,b o)}
(50)
Lemma 8 There exist Lagrangian multipliers
¡
λ+,µ +¢
≥ 0 and (λ∗,µ ∗) ≥ 0 to the two
optimization problems above.
Proof. Since I is diﬀerentiable, all functions involved on the right hand side of the
above two equations are diﬀerentiable. There must be a set of Lagrangian multipliers
¡
λ+,µ +¢
≥ 0 and (λ∗,µ ∗) ≥ 0 associated with the constrained optimization problem
when the two constraints that build Z
g1
n (bo)=( 1 − bo)z − π(z) ≤ C (51)
g2
n (bo)=bo ≤ ˆ b, (52)
37a n dt h et w ot h a tb u i l dY ∗
g1
a (zo,b o)=( 1 − bo)zo − π(zo)(1 − w) ≤ C (53)
g2
a (zo,b o)=bo ≤ ˆ b. (54)
are diﬀerentiable with a non-zero ﬁrst order derivative in either zo or bo. Since zo > 0,
this obviously holds true.
Lemma 9 Suppose that vno adj. and vadj. are diﬀerentiable. Note that this does not hinge
on the diﬀerentiability of v, but hinges on the Hessian to the optimization problem (49).









+ λ+e − λ+ ¡
1 − b+¢







Proof. Denote b+ and (z∗,b ∗) some maximizers of the no adjustment and the adjust-
ment case respectively. Under the assumed diﬀerentiability the Envelope Theorem gen-
erates the result. Recall that e v(z,b+): =π(z)+(ψ(1 − δ)e(b+) − (1 − b+))z+I (z,b+).
Next we deﬁne an auxiliary function, which is deﬁned for arbitrary weakly positive
adjustment costs w not restricted to [0,1]:
J(z,b,w): =e v(z,b) − wπ(z) (57)
= π(z)(1 − w) − (1 − b)z + ψ(1 − δ)e(b)z + I(z,ze(b)) (58)
We ﬁrst show that critical adjustment costs exist, so that the ﬁrm becomes indiﬀerent
between adjusting and not adjusting.




Proof. As v satisﬁes the Bellman-equation, it must be bounded. However, since
v(z,ze,0) = sup
(zo,bo)∈Y ∗(ze,0)
J(zo,b o,0) ≥ sup
(zo,bo)∈Y ∗(ze,w)
J(zo,b o,w)
always hold, J must be bounded, too.
38Corollary 1 vno adj. and Jmax(z,e,w): = s u p
(zo,bo)∈Y ∗(ze,w)
J(zo,b o,w) are both bounded.
Lemma 11 (a) J and Jmax are strictly monotonously decreasing in w without bound.
(b) vno adj. is independent of w.
Proof. (a) For any w1,w 2 ∈ [0;1]:w1 <w 2 we have:
J(z,b,w2)=e v(z,b) − w2π(z)
< e v(z,b) − w1π(z)=J (z,b,w1)
And since Y2 := Y (z,e,w2) ⊂ Y (z,e,w1)= :Y1, we get:
Jmax(z,e,w2)= m a x
(zo,bo)∈Y2





J(zo,b o,w 1)=Jmax (w1,z,e)
(b) follows directly from the deﬁnition of vno adj..
Proposition 2 Deﬁne for Z 6= ∅ as an implicit function w(z,e) by
Jmax(ez,w) − vno adj.(z,ez)=0 (59)
Then ﬁrms adjust if their current adjustment cost factor w is smaller than w(z,e) or if
Z = ∅.
Proof. That a unique w(z,e) equating Jmax and vno adj. (z,ez) exists, follows from
Jmax(ez,w) ≥ vno adj.(z,ez) ∀(z,e) together with the monotonicity of Jmax in w. As
argued in the main text ﬁrms adjust if Z = ∅ or Jmax(ze,w) >v no adj. (z,ze).S i n c e
Jmax is monotonously decreasing in w this inequality holds if and only if w<w.
N e x t ,w es h o wt h a tt h es e to fm a x i m i z e r sm u s ta tl e a s tb eﬁnite, if there is no unique
maximizing (z,b)-pair
Proposition 3 Suppose that π and r are analytic, that J(z,b,w) is analytic and thus
the set Q of (zo,b o) ∈ Y ∗(C,w) such that J(zo,b o,w)=Jmax(C,w) is a non-empty set
with a ﬁnite number of points.
Proof. Since I is analytic, so is J. As J is analytic it must be continuous, too. Since
Y ∗(C,w) is compact this ensures that J attains its maximum on a non-empty compact
set Q. Since J is analytic the maxima are isolated, so that Q contains a ﬁnite number
of elements.
39Finally, we derive the reaction of critical costs ¯ w to changes in e and z.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the assumptions of 9 hold, then w(z,e) is diﬀerentiable on
the open and convex set ¯ A :=
n
(e,z) ∈ R2




, of which A is the border.
Then also Ω(z,e) is diﬀerentiable on R2
























Proof. As (59) implicitly deﬁnes ¯ w, ¯ w is diﬀerentiable when Jmax and vno adj. are
diﬀerentiable, this ensures the assumption. We can alternatively (see main text) write
the equation which implicitly deﬁnes ¯ w as:
¯ w(z,e)π(z∗ (z,e, ¯ w)) = ˜ v(z∗ (z,e, ¯ w),b∗ (z,e, ¯ w)) − ˜ v(z,b+ (z,e)).















Now subtract ¯ w∂π
∂z
∂z∗
∂e from both sides, and observe that vadj(z,ze, ¯ w)=˜ v(z∗ (z,e, ¯ w),b ∗ (z,e, ¯ w))−




















Lemma 9 now yields the stated result.
5.4 Data Appendix
5.4.1 Construction of the database and deﬁnition of the variables
The Cambridge DTI data covers in total 50494 company-year observations with com-
panies coming from a variety of industries. 20 of these industries are classiﬁed as man-
ufacturing. Our ﬁnally selected sample—as discussed in the main text—consists of 6272
observations from 631 ﬁrms, the number of observations for each industry are shown in
40Table 6: Number of observations per industry
Industry Observations
5 mixed activities, manuf. 190






33 mechanical engineering 950




39 metal goods 285
41 textiles 416
43 leather 45
44 footwear & clothing 236
46 non-metallic mineral 256
47 timber 84
48 paper, printing, publ. 494
49 other manufacturing 306
91 manufacturing 95
Table 7: Deﬁnitions of variables in terms of basic sample items
Item Variable No. Item Variable No.
Land & buildings, K# (gross) var114 Sales, Y var127
Depreciation on K#., DK var117 Liabilities, D var8+var9+var10
Machinery, etc. , M# (gross) var115 +var11+var12-var5
Depreciation on M#, DM var118 Liquid assets, var19+var20+var21
Employee remuneration, wL var135 LA +0.5*var18
table 6. Each company year in the DTI data includes 150 variables extracted from the
published company account.
These variables are numbered var1-var150 and in what follows reference is to these
numbers. Besides this data, the database also includes identiﬁcation variables. Table 7
gives the basic deﬁnitions of the variables that we use.
The preliminary values for buildings K# and machinery M# just as the values for
depreciation, sales and remuneration are directly taken from the data. Both actual
capital series, K and M, are generated by the perpetual inventory method, taking the
ﬁrst reported value for a company (in period Tmin





























Pt . The series for machinery M
is constructed analogously to K.
41All other items are directly inﬂated using the price index. To calculate the equity
ratio—which is based on book values—we ﬁrst add up all long-term liabilities (var8), bank
loans (var9), trade liabilities (var10), interest liabilities (var11), and tax liabilities minus
tax reserves (var12-var5). From this number we then subtract the value of liquid assets,
which are composed of marketable securities (var19), tax reserve certiﬁcates (var20),
cash (var21) and 50% of the trade claims the company holds (var18).32 This sum we
now divide by the book value of assets, M +K, and subtract the result (the debt ratio)
from 1 to obtain the equity ratio:
eit =






Depreciation rates are calculated as the book value of depreciation over the actual book





. Firm average depreciation rates ¯ δiK are then calcu-
lated as the simple arithmetic average over a ﬁrm’s depreciation rates. Finally investment








5.4.2 Constructing the capital productivity measure
To construct the measure ξit of the desired stock of capital, we start from the optimiza-
tion problem of a ﬁrm that employs three factors: Land K, Machinery, M, and Labor L.
It produces according to a Cobb-Douglas production function with decreasing returns
to scale (e.g. due to monopoly power)
ln(Yit)=α0
it + αiK ln(Kit)+αiL ln(Lit)+αiM ln(Mit),α iK + αiL + αiM < 1 (62)
Assuming M and L can be adjusted without adjustment costs yields as ﬁrst order
optimality conditions
αiLYit = witLit (63)
αiMYit =( r + δiM)Mit. (64)
Assuming this also holds for K in the long-run, we can estimate αiX as the industry
32This means we use a relatively conservative valuation rule for trade claims. From the balance it is






























Moreover, substituting (63) and (64) into (62), we obtain
ln(Yit)(1 − αiL − αiM)=α0
























r + ¯ δiM
¶
, (65)












Now, there are three ways to estimate ξit. All three methods estimate ψK
i by using
the expenditure shares as estimates for the alphas and hence yield ˆ ψ
K
i = ˆ αiK
(1−ˆ αiL−ˆ αiM).
However, they diﬀer in the way ψ0
it is estimated. Basically they all result from invert-
ing (62) to obtain total factor productivity α0
it and then subsequently substituting in
(66). However, they diﬀer in such way that the indirect calculations replace yit by the
expenditure on other factors. For the actual calculations, these three options sometimes
ignore constant factors that will be cancelled out by the within transformation anyway.
43Table 8: Factor analysis and descriptive statistics
for the three measures of capital productivity
Factor Eigenvalue Diﬀerence Proportion Cumulative
1(ξit) 2.6140 2.650 1.035 1.035
2 -0.0361 0.016 -0.014 1.021
3 -0.0524 . -0.021 1.000
Factor Loadings Scoring Coeﬃcients
Variable ξit Uniqueness Variable ξit
ξ
(1)










it 0.9552 0.0876 ξ
(3)
it 0.3621
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ξ(1), direct 6272 12.675 1.532 5.389 17.449
ξ(2), machinery 6272 12.152 1.655 5.021 17.986
ξ(3), labor 6272 11.578 1.539 1.893 16.890




yit − ˆ αiKkit − ˆ αiM ln(Mit) − ˆ αiL ln(witLit)





1 − ˆ αiL − ˆ αiM













1 − ˆ αiL − ˆ αiM








1 − ˆ αiK − ˆ αiL − ˆ αiM
kit. (69)
All three measures are highly correlated, but diﬀe rs o m e w h a t .I fw ea s s u m et h a ta l l
three of them measure the true capital productivity ξit with an error, i.e.
ξ
(j)
it = bjξit + η
(j)
it (70)
we can recover ξit by factor analysis as the common factor in all three measures. Indeed,
we ﬁnd only one signiﬁcant common factor. Interestingly, in line with Cooper and Halti-
wanger’s (2002) ﬁnding, the indirect measure based on the labor employment decision,
ξ
(3)
it , is most informative as a stand alone measure, which can be seen from the factor
loadings (uniqueness).
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